According to METI statistics released last week, the total newly installed capacity of renewable electricity generation in Japan during the first year of the feed-in-tariff (July 1 2012 to June 30 2013) amounts to 3.666 Gigawatts of capacity, a 15% increase in Japan's renewable energy generation capacity.
More than 95% of the newly installed capacity is solar PV -- no surprise given the comparative difficulty of siting, permitting and building other types of renewables in Japan. Of the new capacity, 1.379GW is residential solar PV, and 2.12GW is commercial/utility scale, so-called "mega" solar installations.
The 3.5GW of new solar far exceeded METI's plan for 2.0GW installations. Wind power, on the other hand, barely shows up as a blip on the radar. Siting of major wind farms takes a very long time in Japan, and NIMBY opposition makes it nearly impossible.
The 3.5GW of installed solar is only a small fraction of the 22GW that has been METI "certified" solar PV. The bulk of the to-be-built projects are mega solar. Even if many of those projects are never built due to issues with land rights, land use approvals, utility interconnection and/or financing, a portion of the 22GW will be build, and yet further project will be certified. It should be easy to exceed 3.5GW of newly installed solar PV in Japan during July 1, 2013-June 30, 2014.
Many sources indicate that the new renewables capacity is equivalent to "3 nuclear power plants". That is not quite accurate. There is no technical reason that a nuclear plant with 1GW generating capacity should not operate 80% or more of the time. The U.S. nuclear reactor "fleet" operates at higher than 85% load factor (capacity utilization). In fact, prior to March 11, 2011, Japanese nuclear plants had a very low average load factor -- more like 60%. Solar facilities, on the other hand, operate at or near their rating peak capacity for only a few hours a day, so have only 10-12% of the annual kWh generation of a 24x7 plant operating at full capacity. When this discount is applied, 3.5GW of solar PV installation is closer to one half of a Japanese nuclear reactor.)
Since the March 11, 2011 disasters, energy policy in Japan has evolved rapidly. These issues are too important for discussion to be limited to a small group of bureaucrats and industry executives.
Sunday, October 6, 2013
Japan Auto Fuel Efficiency to Soar
![]() |
The Toyota Prius Plug in Hybrid version. Rated at 61 kpl of gasoline (143 mpg) |
And of course the Japanese manufacturers first made in-roads into the U.S. market by having a fuel economy advantage over Detroit and its big "gas guzzlers".
Of course, Japanese conditions are not so different from some parts of Europe -- expensive gas and tolls, limited parking. But the Japanese "Galapagos" industry structure has seen the automobile market evolve in a very different way than Europe -- for example, Japan has almost no diesel passenger cars, much more like the U.S. than Europe. Only in very recent years has Mazda implemented a "clean diesel" version of its CX-5 SUV, and Nissan its X-Trail SUV. Volkswagen is present in the Japanese market, ... but does not try to market its diesel TDI engines.
And of course, Japan has been the leader in introducing hybrid gas/electric vehicles, with Toyota and Honda very much in the lead in commercializing these technologies.
And within the past few years, MANY new Japanese cars now feature the "idling stop", with engines turning off and restarting automatically at intersections.
Another feature of the Japanese market is the widespread role of "kei" cars -- light cars with less than 1000cc displacement engines and meeting other requirements. They are recognizable by their yellow license plates. The kei cars are assigned significantly lower automobile taxes -- an incentive that foreign manufacturers have often complained about, since their models do not meet the requirements, and the requirements do not relate directly to fuel economy. Japanese car companies such as Daihatsu or Suzuki are known primarily for their kei cars. The major companies also have a large number of choices of kei models.
And, of course, there are a few electric-only cars in Japan, notably the Nissan Leaf and Mitsubishi i-MIEV. To date these have only limited presence (range anxiety), despite efforts to implement networks of charging stations and despite the relatively short distances of average urban Japanese auto trips.
And just as in other markets, the government currently offers substantial incentives -- cash rebate, tax reduction, etc. -- for "eco cars" that meet fuel efficiency, emission and other requirements.
How far has Japan gone toward a post-modern, fuel efficient automobile fleet?
A few commonly available statistics should help:
In FY2012, approximately 40% of Toyota's Japanese passenger car sales were of hybrid gas/electric models. For the first six months of the current fiscal year (April to September 2013) period, the top selling car models in Japan were:
1. Toyota Aqua subcompact hybrid. 127,993 units. Rated* at 35.4 km/L (83.26 mpg equivalent)
2. Toyota Prius compact hybrid. 121,634 units. Rated at 30.4 to 34.6 km/L (71.5 to 76.7 mpg)
3. Honda N Box kei car. 110,155 units. Rated at up to 24.2 km/L (56.9 mpg) with a small (less than 1000cc) advanced gasoline engine and continuously variable transmission (CVT). List price from around 1.36 million yen (~$14,000).
4. Daihatsu Move kei car. 107,591 units. Rated at up to 29 km/L (68.2 mpg) with an advanced gasoline engine, CVT and list price between $10000 and $12500.
5. Suzuki Wagon R kei car. 88,071 units. Rated at 30km/L (70.5 mpg) with an advanced gasoline engine and, of course, idling stop (which kicks in when the car slows to under 13 kph). Suzuki also heavily promotes its regenerative braking -- the car battery is charged largely by recapture of braking forces. Even without a hybrid powertrain, mileage goes up when all the electronics, including A/C, get power from recaptured brake energy.
If these are the best selling cars in Japan, then imagine what the entire fleet's fuel economy will look like in 5-10 years time!
*Of course, the fuel economy ratings (using "JC08" mode--more conservative than "JC10/JC15" modes used in the past) are based on assumptions and do not necessarily prove out in real driving conditions. I rented a Toyota Aqua hybrid this summer and drove it mostly on expressways, including some long climbs and descents and generally at speeds of 100 kph or so with A/C on for two days, and ended up with mileage of just under 25 km/L (58 mpg).
After leading the market with its near-experimental Honda Insight in the 1990s, Honda has trailed Toyota in the hybrid "race" in recent years, as it used a "weak" style hybrid in its Civic Hybrid and 2010 Insight (introduced around the same time as, and upstaged by, a new version of the Toyota Prius that had better fuel economy).
![]() |
1990s Honda Insight |
![]() |
2010 Honda Insight |
![]() |
Honda Accord hybrid - now with 30 km/L hybrid version |
![]() |
Honda Fit -- 36.4 km/L hybrid version available |
The plug-in Prius will drive the initial 26 kms using only its electric engine, and so actual gas mileage can be infinite if you never drive further than that. It is rated at 61 km/L using JC08 mode. (If that is not good enough for you, the plug-in hybrid Mitsubishi Outlander, an SUV-like model, if fully charged will go the first 60 km on its electric engine, and is rated at 67 km/L overall (not on the best seller list, but the family of one of Misako's friends has one).
![]() |
Toyota hybrid models |
![]() |
Toyota's Lexus mark hybrid modeles |
Nissan's line-up includes a dizzying mix of "eco cars", including the all electric Leaf, several hybrids, the 25 km/liter "eco supercharger" equipped Nissan Note.
Even Subaru now has a hybrid version of its SV "all wheel drive" small SUV. Going from the regular 2.0L engine to the hybrid model boosts rated mileage from 15.8 km/L to 20 km/L (47 mpg).
Of course, there are some imported cars and foreign makes in Japan. Mercedes Benz, BMW, and VW/Audi are doing well. Then again, the Mercedes closest to me (my next door neighbor) is one of these -- a Daimler/Mercedes Benz group Smart all-electric two seat car, with a 180 km range (measured in JC08 mode, more like 140 kms based on US/European measurements).
So even if Japan trails Europe in wind, solar and other renewables, its automobile companies are doing their part at the transition to a green energy future.
Monday, September 30, 2013
Further Electricity Deregulation coming down the pike
Although the first of three proposed electricity deregulation bills was delayed by this summer's Upper House election, progress on the topic continues within METI and its advisory councils.
The METI electricity system reform subcommittee's working group on "system design" held its second meeting on September 19, 2013. According to materials presented by the ministry at that meeting, retailers of electricity will be subject to a registration (rather than a full approval/license) system.
The registration will allow for greater new entrants than approval/license system, but will still allow for the ministry to sanction retailers who fail to perform their contracts with customers. In contrast, companies wishing to engage in transmission business will need to apply for licenses and go through a more rigorous approval process.
Retail competition is targeted for residential and small commercial users in 2016. Prices will remain regulated for some 5-7 years until 2020-22, in order to protect consumers. There is a lot more detail (in Japanese, of course) in these proposals to work through -- essential reading for anyone trying to understand what is being planned.
The METI electricity system reform subcommittee's working group on "system design" held its second meeting on September 19, 2013. According to materials presented by the ministry at that meeting, retailers of electricity will be subject to a registration (rather than a full approval/license) system.
The registration will allow for greater new entrants than approval/license system, but will still allow for the ministry to sanction retailers who fail to perform their contracts with customers. In contrast, companies wishing to engage in transmission business will need to apply for licenses and go through a more rigorous approval process.
Retail competition is targeted for residential and small commercial users in 2016. Prices will remain regulated for some 5-7 years until 2020-22, in order to protect consumers. There is a lot more detail (in Japanese, of course) in these proposals to work through -- essential reading for anyone trying to understand what is being planned.
Sunday, September 29, 2013
Cleaning up the power utility poles/lines for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics
The Abe government's schedule for restructuring the Japanese electric power system -- ultimately leading to some kind of separation of generation, transmission and distribution functions -- leads to the year 2020.
By coincidence, 2020 is also the year of the Tokyo Olympics, which will be the target of an effort by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLITT?) to bury power cables in core areas of Tokyo.
The story in Nikkei (September 29) indicates that whereas 100% of electric cables are buried in London, Paris and Hong Kong, in Tokyo 23 wards the percentage is more like 40%, Osaka lower yet, and Nagoya only 20%. Overall in Japan only something like 15% of electric cables are buried. Indeed, for many decades the mess of overhead cables and numerous reinforced concrete poles criss-crossing the countryside are one of the most remarked-upon aspects of Japan--the nation's worst eyesore.
As Japanologist Alex Kerr wrote in 1994 in his classic Lost Japan:
"And the electric wires! Japan is the only advanced nation in the world that does not bury electric lines in its towns and cities, and this is a prime factor in the squalid visual impression of its urban areas. Out in the suburbs, the use of electric lines is even worse."
"I was once taken to see the new Yokohama residential district Kohoku New Town, and was amazed at the multitude of enormous steel pylons and smaller utility poles clustered everywhere--a hellish web of power lines darkening the sky above one's head. This is a site considered a model of urban development. ..."
The plan just announced is now to eliminate all utility poles from areas in Tokyo near train stations, airports and other places that tourists are likely to visit. The reasoning is said to be for both improved view/aesthetics and also for greater resilience in event of natural disasters. The plan covers approximately 130 kilometers (80 miles) of streets.
The total cost is estimated at 78 billion yen (approximately $780 million). Bear in mind that this price tag will only deal with the issue in the most crowded and central areas of Tokyo -- an area in which 80% of cables are already buried. The cost will be shared, one-third borne by the national government, one-third by the Tokyo Metro government, and one-third by the electric utilities whose wires will be moved (NTT and TEPCO, in this case). As a taxpayer to both the national and Tokyo governments and a forced customer of both NTT and TEPCO, I guess I am a significant contributor to the effort. Still, in this case, the expense is long overdue.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
TEPCO Turn-around Effort
September 25 (Wednesday's) evening NHK newscast had coverage of the President of TEPCO meeting with Governor Izumida of Niigata Prefecture to present paperwork including details about plans to make the TEPCO Kashiwazaki Kariwa ("K-K") reactors safer and apply for a restart of reactors 6 and 7. The last meeting between these two, a few months ago, featured the Governor on camera screaming, loudly, at the much smaller, weaker looking TEPCO president, angry because TEPCO was taking steps to apply for a restart of Reactors 6 and 7 before obtaining the Prefecture's approval.
This time, TEPCO signalled well in advance that it would NOT apply for a restart of the reactors before "gaining the understanding" of Niigata Prefecture. Also, a flurry of press stories has reported in recent days on TEPCO's dismal finances, the pressure from its banks and bondholders, and the importance of a reactor restart as part of its financial rehabilitation plan.
Instead of a shouting match, the Governor asked why Niigata should trust TEPCO to do things any differently than in the past. TEPCO President Hirose mumbled something about TEPCO being "reborn" ("Shinsei TEPCO") and having taken the Government's money, ... then pointed out that TEPCO is now planning to install extremely expensive filtered vents that would allow venting of the reactor buildings without release of significant radioactive materials. Had these vents been in place at Fukushima Dai-ichi, TEPCO would have vented the buildings and avoided the hydrogen buildup which contributed to the problems there -- at least the most visible sign of catastrophe, with hydrogen explosions sending radioactive material high into the atmosphere.
(The K-K 6 and 7 reactors are relatively new, commissioned in 1996 and 1997, respectively, and are "advanced boiling water reactors." The other reactors at K-K were commissioned between 1985 and 1994 -- also nowhere near as old as Fukushima Dai-ichi 1 and 2, but there are concerns about potential earthquake faults on site that run directly under or very near reactors 1-5 and their turbine buildings. The K-K complex suffered various types of damage in a 2007 earthquake and the first of its reactors did not reopen until 2 years later. Also, estimates of earthquake intensity from nearby faults has been increased significantly in the post-2011 reassessment, so it is not clear that the current designs would be sufficient, even absent the on-site faults.)
NHK followed this theme (based on talking points from the central government and TEPCO?) and indicated that reopening the K-K 6 and 7 reactors could add billions to TEPCO's bottom line annually (the NHK report said 240 to 350 billion yen -- 2.4 to 3.5 billion dollars -- annually), helping to avoid another rate increase, more government bailout money, etc.
A story in this morning (Thursday's) Nikkei reports that TEPCO has a refinancing of some debt approaching this autumn, and the financial institutions are indicating that in order to participate they will significantly increase the interest rate charged unless either (1) TEPCO has applied for a restart of K-K 6&7 reactors, or (2) TEPCO has further increased its electricity rate. The TEPCO management is bending over backwards to try to avoid another rate increase so quickly after its 2012 increase, and so has everything riding on a restart of the reactors.
To put this in perspective, the K-K reactors 6 and 7 each have maximum power output of 1315MW. Even if they do restart in the next year or two, after very expensive upgrades, TEPCO is very unlikely to achieve a restart of any of the rest of its reactors over that time-frame. TEPCO's pre-March 2011 nuclear reactors consisted of:
1. 2812MW -- Reactors 1 to 4 at Fukushima Dai-ichi. These were catastrophically damaged and will be a burden for many decades and, of course, never restart.
2. 1884MW -- Reactors 5 and 6 at Fukushima Dai-ichi. These were not damaged, but are on the same site and will be decommissioned. Prime Minister Abe officially requested earlier this month that TEPCO decommission these.
3. 4400MW -- Fukushima Dai-Ni reactors 1 to 4. This facility is down the coast 20-25 kms from Fukushima Dai-Ichi. It is highly likely these will never be restarted.
4. 8212MW -- Kashiwazaki-Kariwa (or Kariba) reactors 1 to 7. Again, the restart of reactors 6 and 7 remains very uncertain and very expensive, while reactors 1 to 5 have additional problems and earthquake concerns that will make them more difficult, if not impossible, to restart.
So out of the total nameplate capacity of 17.3GW of nuclear generation, TEPCO is working toward a possible restart of 2.63GW -- just 15% of the total.
The TEPCO restructuring problem was the subject of an analysis piece in Nikkei Wednesday morning as well, by Chuo University law professor Junji Annen. Prof. Annen notes that TEPCO has ultimate compensation obligations from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident of between 5 and 10 trillion yen, that the nuclear compensation body has provided 4 trillion yen (40 billion dollars) of funding (3 trillion of grants/subsidies and 1 trillion yen of capital); that TEPCO raised rates significantly; and yet TEPCO still had an aggregate loss of 700 billion yen (>$7 billion) for the two years ended March 31, 2013. The loss was recorded despite TEPCO's ability to book the 3 trillion yen (>$30 billion) of the government subsidies as extraordinary income, so the actual situation is far, far worse. Prof. Annen notes that both a cap on TEPCO compensation obligations (as opposed to government clean-up efforts) AND a reactor restart at K-K are essential for TEPCO's near-term survival, while the longer-term solution will involve some kind of restructuring that divides TEPCO into a "good" and "bad" company. The "good" company will be freed of impossible burdens, but would pay a share of its profit to fund the "bad" company and meet a portion of such obligations.
UPDATE: One day after this post, the Niigata government has given TEPCO its "conditional" support for TEPCO to at least proceed with filing its application with respect to K-K reactors 6 and 7. The prefecture has apparently taken the view that this is not a "final" approval, which will be subject to satisfaction on various safety issues, but only a nod to allow TEPCO to make its filing.
By Friday, the group of all major (and some minor) Japanese banks that faced an upcoming TEPCO refinancing had indicated that, given the restart application for K-K reactors 6 & 7, they would NOT require TEPCO to file for a rate increase and, at least tentatively, that they plan to participate in the refinancing.
On Saturday, the 28th, TEPCO's President was interviewed by Nikkei Shimbun and stated that, in light of the prospect that these reactors might be operating in 2014, TEPCO plans to announce a restructuring plan later this year that would not include further rate increases, and hopes to avoid a loss for the fiscal year that ends March 31, 2014.
A look at TEPCO's implementation of its current restructuring plan does not offer high hopes.
The current plan had proposed restarting K-K reactors 6 & 7 by April, 2013, six months ago. It also contemplated decommissioning only Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactors 1 through 4, whereas now 5 and 6 also must be decommissioned. Now, TEPCO hopes to squeeze out additional 10-year cost reductions of 140 billion yen, following its current plan of 336 billion yen in reductions. And TEPCO also plans to establish an arm to participate in deregulated portions of the electricity market, as Chubu Electric and Kansai Electric also have announced. Maybe TEPCO will be able to reduce customer outflow if it "counterattacks" in the home regions of other utilities?
We should know before too long if the hope for a profit in the current TEPCO fiscal year is more "happy talk" to support Abenomics and improve the economic mood--a thank you present for well-orchestrated government support to bring Niigata's governor and the financial institutions into line for the time being--or if it can actually be achieved (and, if so, whether it involves the same kind of accounting magic that limited the last two years' losses to 700 billion yen).
UPDATE: Reuters had a good article today (October 7, 2013) on the TEPCO turnaround effort -- the public relations and the reality. As one analyst indicates, "it's all kabuki ... It's very much an orchestrated presentation". I hope my blog post gives some sense of the way these things are done in Japan, at least at the public level.
Also the Yomiuri mentions that the LDP is now seriously considering a "good bank bad bank" approach to TEPCO, hiving off the legacy problem of decommissioning its reactors and dealing with the Fukushima mess. Since TEPCO does not have the resources to deal with its legacy issues, this is perhaps inevitable. But if and only if it is done in a manner that ensures the "good TEPCO" will move forward faithfully to implement a competitive market in electricity, including separation of generation, transmission and distribution.
UPDATE: One day after this post, the Niigata government has given TEPCO its "conditional" support for TEPCO to at least proceed with filing its application with respect to K-K reactors 6 and 7. The prefecture has apparently taken the view that this is not a "final" approval, which will be subject to satisfaction on various safety issues, but only a nod to allow TEPCO to make its filing.
By Friday, the group of all major (and some minor) Japanese banks that faced an upcoming TEPCO refinancing had indicated that, given the restart application for K-K reactors 6 & 7, they would NOT require TEPCO to file for a rate increase and, at least tentatively, that they plan to participate in the refinancing.
On Saturday, the 28th, TEPCO's President was interviewed by Nikkei Shimbun and stated that, in light of the prospect that these reactors might be operating in 2014, TEPCO plans to announce a restructuring plan later this year that would not include further rate increases, and hopes to avoid a loss for the fiscal year that ends March 31, 2014.
A look at TEPCO's implementation of its current restructuring plan does not offer high hopes.
The current plan had proposed restarting K-K reactors 6 & 7 by April, 2013, six months ago. It also contemplated decommissioning only Fukushima Dai-ichi Reactors 1 through 4, whereas now 5 and 6 also must be decommissioned. Now, TEPCO hopes to squeeze out additional 10-year cost reductions of 140 billion yen, following its current plan of 336 billion yen in reductions. And TEPCO also plans to establish an arm to participate in deregulated portions of the electricity market, as Chubu Electric and Kansai Electric also have announced. Maybe TEPCO will be able to reduce customer outflow if it "counterattacks" in the home regions of other utilities?
We should know before too long if the hope for a profit in the current TEPCO fiscal year is more "happy talk" to support Abenomics and improve the economic mood--a thank you present for well-orchestrated government support to bring Niigata's governor and the financial institutions into line for the time being--or if it can actually be achieved (and, if so, whether it involves the same kind of accounting magic that limited the last two years' losses to 700 billion yen).
UPDATE: Reuters had a good article today (October 7, 2013) on the TEPCO turnaround effort -- the public relations and the reality. As one analyst indicates, "it's all kabuki ... It's very much an orchestrated presentation". I hope my blog post gives some sense of the way these things are done in Japan, at least at the public level.
Also the Yomiuri mentions that the LDP is now seriously considering a "good bank bad bank" approach to TEPCO, hiving off the legacy problem of decommissioning its reactors and dealing with the Fukushima mess. Since TEPCO does not have the resources to deal with its legacy issues, this is perhaps inevitable. But if and only if it is done in a manner that ensures the "good TEPCO" will move forward faithfully to implement a competitive market in electricity, including separation of generation, transmission and distribution.
Wednesday, August 21, 2013
LNG Prices go ... EVEN HIGHER in Japan this summer
According to press reports, spot LNG import prices into Japan are reportedly back about US$16 per MMBTU (million BTUs) since May, as increased demand for summer electricity generation pushes up the prices.
South Korea also is now in a partial nuclear shutdown/suspension mode, because of safety concerns about faked certificates and suspect equipment, and this has further added to demand, together with extreme, protracted hot weather.
The $16 per MMBTU price is a 10% increase from the lows reached in springtime, but down from the nearly $20 peak reached in January/early February. US Henry Hub gas prices in recent years have been between $2 and $4. Add another $3 or $4 for liquefaction and transport, and the obvious question is why Japanese prices should ever exceed the $8-$10 range over the medium/long term?
This situation highlights the need for Japan to diversify its sources of LNG supply, and to take advantage of potential increased lower-priced natural gas availability all around the Pacific Rim (starting with the U.S. and Canada), if it is to manage a transition away from nuclear power.
Retail Electricity Competition -- Nippon Paper Enters Market
According to the August 20, 2013 Nikkei, Nippon Paper will participate in retail sales of electric power from 2014. The company is planning 2 or 3 new conventional fuel (natural gas?) generating stations to secure approximately 400MW of generating capacity, and will sell power at discounted prices to companies and local governments. Nippon Paper expects to achieve sales second only to Ennet, the leading competitive electricity supplier, which is backed by the NTT Group as well as Tokyo Gas and Osaka Gas.
The paper industry in Japan has been in a steady to declining state for many years. Companies have gradually merged out of existence, with the final headline transaction Oji Paper's attempt at a hostile acquisition of Hokuetsu in 2006-07, thwarted by Nippon Paper acquiring a large, defensive stake in the target. To me, electric power retailing looks like a much better business going forward, especially for a company with a large base of industrial land, and at least some existing generating capacity for internal demand. If I were a neighbor, I would probably prefer a gas-fired power plant to a pulp and paper mill. (In my youth, I remember the stench of the paper mills at Camus, Washington, crossing the Columbia River into Oregon as we would head out the Columbia River Gorge from Portland! They would always say that to Camus residents "it smells like money", ... but still, better the money without the stench.)
The Nikkei indicates that over 100 companies are expected to participate in electricity sales by end of 2013. In addition to Ennet, other existing players are F-Power, JX Nikko Nisseki Energy, Marubeni, Summit Energy, Nihon Techno and Shin Nittetsu Engineering.
Once these companies secure significant generating capacity and access to the transmission and distribution grid, the existing utilities will see a steady, continued decline in their customers.
The paper industry in Japan has been in a steady to declining state for many years. Companies have gradually merged out of existence, with the final headline transaction Oji Paper's attempt at a hostile acquisition of Hokuetsu in 2006-07, thwarted by Nippon Paper acquiring a large, defensive stake in the target. To me, electric power retailing looks like a much better business going forward, especially for a company with a large base of industrial land, and at least some existing generating capacity for internal demand. If I were a neighbor, I would probably prefer a gas-fired power plant to a pulp and paper mill. (In my youth, I remember the stench of the paper mills at Camus, Washington, crossing the Columbia River into Oregon as we would head out the Columbia River Gorge from Portland! They would always say that to Camus residents "it smells like money", ... but still, better the money without the stench.)
The Nikkei indicates that over 100 companies are expected to participate in electricity sales by end of 2013. In addition to Ennet, other existing players are F-Power, JX Nikko Nisseki Energy, Marubeni, Summit Energy, Nihon Techno and Shin Nittetsu Engineering.
Once these companies secure significant generating capacity and access to the transmission and distribution grid, the existing utilities will see a steady, continued decline in their customers.
Monday, July 22, 2013
Fukushima Dai-Ichi -- Is it Still News?
I have heard two ACCJ (American Chamber of Commerce in Japan) guest speaker presentations in the past year where a foreign expert on the nuclear industry -- one primarily a regulator, the other a consultant/academic -- has complained about the approach the Japanese press has taken to reporting on the Fukushima nuclear accident. Both speakers grumbled that as long as the press keeps dramatising events related to Fukushima, it will be difficult for the nuclear industry to regain trust of the Japanese people and for nuclear reactors to play a role in Japan's energy future.
Indeed, a recent public opinion poll suggests that 94% believe the Fukushima accident is not "under control", and yes, the press does report on some continued, very real, issues at the plant.
But my view is that the press coverage of Fukushima is not one-sided or anti-nuclear. Instead, it largely reflects the editorial views of the particular media conglomerate.
Thus, the "progressive" Asahi Shimbun and Asahi TV are predictably happy to report about ugly goings on regarding Fukushima.
Meanwhile, the "conservative" Yomiuri seems to want to say the bare minimum about Fukushima. Stories about Fukushima get in the way of its effort to "accentuate the positive" and support the LDP government. The Yomiuri seems to be completely aligned with the government program to restart the reactors. Its editorials claim nuclear power is essential, and safe, and its news reporters seem to fall in line to the maximum extent possible.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, meanwhile, seems to be aligned with the leaders of the business community and the Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), who believe nuclear power is essential to the survival of the Japanese economy, at least over the near and medium-term.
Mainich Shimbun, Fuji-Sankei Group (conservative) -- I do not really know since I do not read or watch their news outlets regularly.
Just one example -- during last week's lead up to the House of Councillors election -- a very politically sensitive period -- a story comes out that up to 2000 workers for TEPCO and its subcontractors received high radiation doses (over 100 millisieverts) in their activities at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, and are thus at heightened risk of thyroid cancer. This was ten times the number of workers who had previously been said to have received such doses.
According to Asahi Shimbun, TEPCO only released the news once it became clear that the World Health Organization questioned the company's method of calculating doses, and planned to release the information -- so that workers would be aware of the situation. Also, TEPCO does not really know how large the doses were, since most of the workers did not have timely tests of their thyroid. Now, 28 months after the accident and much of the exposures, TEPCO has agreed to pay for regularly testing of workers exposed to 100 millisieverts or more.
This story got major coverage in the Asahi Shimbun. It also got major coverage in the English language Japan Times.
In the Yomiuri? Not so much, and only several days later via a wire service report, buried on a lower inside page, next to a much larger story about TEPCO's plans to file an application to restart the Kashiwazaki Kariba plant, reactors 6 and 7. Here is a comparison of the degree of coverage in the Asahi and Yomiuri English language papers web sites (which reflects the offline English and original Japanese versions, in this case).
Asahi (July 19, 2013) online edition:
-----------------------------------------------------
So to any nuclear industry proponent who thinks the Japanese press is hindering the comeback of the nuclear industry, I say -- just read the Yomiuri. You will need to look very carefully to find any negative news.
-----------------------------------------------------
UPDATE: Within a week after this post, continued and new water leakage at Fukushima, including leakage of highly radioactive water into the ocean, brought it back into the "mainstream" of Japanese news, with at least some coverage by ALL the major Japanese press. Everyone seemed to acknowledge that this -- and the central government stepping in to assume control of some remediation operations from TEPCO -- constituted news worth reporting.
Indeed, a recent public opinion poll suggests that 94% believe the Fukushima accident is not "under control", and yes, the press does report on some continued, very real, issues at the plant.
But my view is that the press coverage of Fukushima is not one-sided or anti-nuclear. Instead, it largely reflects the editorial views of the particular media conglomerate.
Thus, the "progressive" Asahi Shimbun and Asahi TV are predictably happy to report about ugly goings on regarding Fukushima.
Meanwhile, the "conservative" Yomiuri seems to want to say the bare minimum about Fukushima. Stories about Fukushima get in the way of its effort to "accentuate the positive" and support the LDP government. The Yomiuri seems to be completely aligned with the government program to restart the reactors. Its editorials claim nuclear power is essential, and safe, and its news reporters seem to fall in line to the maximum extent possible.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, meanwhile, seems to be aligned with the leaders of the business community and the Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), who believe nuclear power is essential to the survival of the Japanese economy, at least over the near and medium-term.
Mainich Shimbun, Fuji-Sankei Group (conservative) -- I do not really know since I do not read or watch their news outlets regularly.
Just one example -- during last week's lead up to the House of Councillors election -- a very politically sensitive period -- a story comes out that up to 2000 workers for TEPCO and its subcontractors received high radiation doses (over 100 millisieverts) in their activities at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, and are thus at heightened risk of thyroid cancer. This was ten times the number of workers who had previously been said to have received such doses.
According to Asahi Shimbun, TEPCO only released the news once it became clear that the World Health Organization questioned the company's method of calculating doses, and planned to release the information -- so that workers would be aware of the situation. Also, TEPCO does not really know how large the doses were, since most of the workers did not have timely tests of their thyroid. Now, 28 months after the accident and much of the exposures, TEPCO has agreed to pay for regularly testing of workers exposed to 100 millisieverts or more.
This story got major coverage in the Asahi Shimbun. It also got major coverage in the English language Japan Times.
In the Yomiuri? Not so much, and only several days later via a wire service report, buried on a lower inside page, next to a much larger story about TEPCO's plans to file an application to restart the Kashiwazaki Kariba plant, reactors 6 and 7. Here is a comparison of the degree of coverage in the Asahi and Yomiuri English language papers web sites (which reflects the offline English and original Japanese versions, in this case).
Asahi (July 19, 2013) online edition:
TEPCO now says 2,000 Fukushima workers exposed to high radiation doses
Estimated radiation doses in thyroid glands exceeded safe levels in nearly 2,000 people who worked at the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant, more than 10 times the number previously announced, The Asahi Shimbun has learned.
The larger figure was deduced after doubts were raised both at home and abroad over the results of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s belated first study on the workers’ health.
TEPCO, the nuclear plant’s operator, said in December that radiation doses topped 100 millisieverts--the widely accepted threshold for an increase in the risk of cancer--in 178 people, with a maximum reading of 11,800 millisieverts.
But that figure covered only a fraction of those who have braved the high radiation levels to try to bring the nuclear crisis under control.
The workers themselves say TEPCO has provided little or no information about radiation doses in their thyroid glands. Some have stopped working at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 plant.
The new figure is based on a review of an expanded number of study subjects.
TEPCO and its partner companies not only re-evaluated the readings from thyroid gland dose tests, but they also estimated doses when the amount of radioactive iodine that entered the body was unavailable. These estimates were based on cesium intake amounts, the airborne iodine-to-cesium ratio on the days they worked, and other data.
The latest study showed that doses topped the 100-millisievert mark in 1,973 workers. In one worker, the estimated thyroid gland dose increased by more than 1,000 millisieverts during the review.
A thyroid gland dose reflects the amount of internal exposure to radioactive iodine that has entered the body through inhalation and other processes. The thyroid gland doses received during the early stages of the nuclear disaster, which started in March 2011, account for most of the potential internal damage to the Fukushima plant workers.
Early on in the crisis, health experts warned about the risks of high radiation doses received by the workers. But TEPCO was late in opening a full-scale investigation into the thyroid gland doses.
The utility submitted data about the doses to the World Health Organization. However, TEPCO only released available data for some of the workers in December after it learned that the WHO was planning to disclose the information.
The data concerned 522 workers for whom thyroid gland dose test results were available.
It took TEPCO 28 months since the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, caused the nuclear disaster to learn that so many workers have been exposed to cancer-inducing levels of radiation doses in their thyroid glands.
(This article was compiled from reports by Yuri Oiwa and Toshio Tada.)
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
Estimated radiation doses in thyroid glands exceeded safe levels in nearly 2,000 people who worked at the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant, more than 10 times the number previously announced, The Asahi Shimbun has learned.
The larger figure was deduced after doubts were raised both at home and abroad over the results of Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s belated first study on the workers’ health.
TEPCO, the nuclear plant’s operator, said in December that radiation doses topped 100 millisieverts--the widely accepted threshold for an increase in the risk of cancer--in 178 people, with a maximum reading of 11,800 millisieverts.
But that figure covered only a fraction of those who have braved the high radiation levels to try to bring the nuclear crisis under control.
The workers themselves say TEPCO has provided little or no information about radiation doses in their thyroid glands. Some have stopped working at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 plant.
The new figure is based on a review of an expanded number of study subjects.
TEPCO and its partner companies not only re-evaluated the readings from thyroid gland dose tests, but they also estimated doses when the amount of radioactive iodine that entered the body was unavailable. These estimates were based on cesium intake amounts, the airborne iodine-to-cesium ratio on the days they worked, and other data.
The latest study showed that doses topped the 100-millisievert mark in 1,973 workers. In one worker, the estimated thyroid gland dose increased by more than 1,000 millisieverts during the review.
A thyroid gland dose reflects the amount of internal exposure to radioactive iodine that has entered the body through inhalation and other processes. The thyroid gland doses received during the early stages of the nuclear disaster, which started in March 2011, account for most of the potential internal damage to the Fukushima plant workers.
Early on in the crisis, health experts warned about the risks of high radiation doses received by the workers. But TEPCO was late in opening a full-scale investigation into the thyroid gland doses.
The utility submitted data about the doses to the World Health Organization. However, TEPCO only released available data for some of the workers in December after it learned that the WHO was planning to disclose the information.
The data concerned 522 workers for whom thyroid gland dose test results were available.
It took TEPCO 28 months since the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, caused the nuclear disaster to learn that so many workers have been exposed to cancer-inducing levels of radiation doses in their thyroid glands.
Its re-evaluation also came after the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which received data from
TEPCO, questioned the reliability of the company’s thyroid gland dose readings. Japan’s health ministry also ordered TEPCO and
its partner companies to review the internal dose readings for the workers.
“We will provide and pay for annual, ultrasound thyroid gland tests to all workers with thyroid gland doses in excess of 100 millisieverts over their lifetimes,” a TEPCO public relations official said. “We have already notified those who are eligible for the checkups.”
But TEPCO said it does not know how many of those eligible workers have actually taken the tests. Sources said only about half of them have received the thyroid gland checkups.
In addition, the utility has not announced a schedule for the thyroid gland checkups for the workers and has yet to explain what it will do when it spots abnormalities during the tests.
Most of the study subjects with thyroid gland doses exceeding 100 millisieverts entered the Fukushima plant site early in the disaster and inhaled radioactive substances. TEPCO employees account for 976 of them, with the remainder employed by the utility’s main contractors and their subcontractors.
Several workers told The Asahi Shimbun that TEPCO has never provided a careful explanation about the risks of radiation exposure in thyroid glands. Some subcontractor workers have already quit their jobs, complaining that they were never told about the radiation doses or received any notification of thyroid gland tests.
The delay in the testing can be partly blamed on a health ministry policy, which says health control for nuclear plant workers should be based solely on whole-body doses.
The ministry has never taken the initiative to investigate thyroid gland doses in the Fukushima workers. It has left the task to TEPCO on a “voluntary” basis.
Some experts have emphasized that enhanced thyroid gland doses do raise the risk of cancer even if the whole-body doses remain modest. But the health ministry has maintained that whole-body dose control is sufficient.
The international consensus for the 100-millisievert threshold for an increased risk of cancer is based partly on studies following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
The international standard for taking iodine tablets to block radiation exposure in thyroid glands, however, is 50 millisieverts.
Some health experts have said the cancer rate began increasing at the 50-millisievert level after the Chernobyl disaster.
Children are believed to be the highest at risk to thyroid gland doses. But a recent study showed the risk of cancer from thyroid gland doses rises even in people over 40, countering the previous belief that older people were far less susceptible to the cancer- inducing effects of radiation.
“We will provide and pay for annual, ultrasound thyroid gland tests to all workers with thyroid gland doses in excess of 100 millisieverts over their lifetimes,” a TEPCO public relations official said. “We have already notified those who are eligible for the checkups.”
But TEPCO said it does not know how many of those eligible workers have actually taken the tests. Sources said only about half of them have received the thyroid gland checkups.
In addition, the utility has not announced a schedule for the thyroid gland checkups for the workers and has yet to explain what it will do when it spots abnormalities during the tests.
Most of the study subjects with thyroid gland doses exceeding 100 millisieverts entered the Fukushima plant site early in the disaster and inhaled radioactive substances. TEPCO employees account for 976 of them, with the remainder employed by the utility’s main contractors and their subcontractors.
Several workers told The Asahi Shimbun that TEPCO has never provided a careful explanation about the risks of radiation exposure in thyroid glands. Some subcontractor workers have already quit their jobs, complaining that they were never told about the radiation doses or received any notification of thyroid gland tests.
The delay in the testing can be partly blamed on a health ministry policy, which says health control for nuclear plant workers should be based solely on whole-body doses.
The ministry has never taken the initiative to investigate thyroid gland doses in the Fukushima workers. It has left the task to TEPCO on a “voluntary” basis.
Some experts have emphasized that enhanced thyroid gland doses do raise the risk of cancer even if the whole-body doses remain modest. But the health ministry has maintained that whole-body dose control is sufficient.
The international consensus for the 100-millisievert threshold for an increased risk of cancer is based partly on studies following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
The international standard for taking iodine tablets to block radiation exposure in thyroid glands, however, is 50 millisieverts.
Some health experts have said the cancer rate began increasing at the 50-millisievert level after the Chernobyl disaster.
Children are believed to be the highest at risk to thyroid gland doses. But a recent study showed the risk of cancer from thyroid gland doses rises even in people over 40, countering the previous belief that older people were far less susceptible to the cancer- inducing effects of radiation.
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
-----------------------------------------------------
Yomiuri (July 21, 2013) online edition:
Higher cancer risk at Fukushima plant
Higher cancer risk at Fukushima plant
July 21, 2013
Jiji Press
Nearly 2,000 workers at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant face higher risks of thyroid cancer as their radiation exposure from the crisis that began at the plant in March 2011 exceeded a key threshold of 100 millisieverts, TEPCO officials have said.
Of all workers engaged in operations to contain the nuclear crisis triggered by the magnitude9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, 1,973 are estimated to have received radiation doses of over 100 millisieverts in their thyroid glands, according to the officials.
Jiji Press
Nearly 2,000 workers at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant face higher risks of thyroid cancer as their radiation exposure from the crisis that began at the plant in March 2011 exceeded a key threshold of 100 millisieverts, TEPCO officials have said.
Of all workers engaged in operations to contain the nuclear crisis triggered by the magnitude9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami, 1,973 are estimated to have received radiation doses of over 100 millisieverts in their thyroid glands, according to the officials.
So to any nuclear industry proponent who thinks the Japanese press is hindering the comeback of the nuclear industry, I say -- just read the Yomiuri. You will need to look very carefully to find any negative news.
-----------------------------------------------------
UPDATE: Within a week after this post, continued and new water leakage at Fukushima, including leakage of highly radioactive water into the ocean, brought it back into the "mainstream" of Japanese news, with at least some coverage by ALL the major Japanese press. Everyone seemed to acknowledge that this -- and the central government stepping in to assume control of some remediation operations from TEPCO -- constituted news worth reporting.
Monday, July 8, 2013
Market Forces Rising
Nikkei Shimbun carried an interesting story in mid-June about the evolving role of Tokyo Electric (TEPCO) with the "electric industry village" now that TEPCO is majority owned by the government's Fukushima accident compensation fund.
TEPCO was traditionally the leader of the 10 regional electric utilities. It was the biggest by revenue, personnel, profit and visibility, and it took the lead on most matters of policy, with the other companies generally following behind and stepping into line.
Recently, however, TEPCO has been different. It seems that one condition to the (first -- more to come) bailout was that TEPCO act as a positive force for change in the industry, in line with METI/government policies. Initially, the group of electric utilities became leaderless. Now, however, others are stepping up, and TEPCO is positively excluded from some of the discussions among the group presidents (which are commonplace, and are conducted via the Denki Jigyou Rengo Kai -- a group housed within the Keidanren Building and formed of the presidents of the utilities. Needless to say, this group does not support major structural reforms of the industry, and so excludes TEPCO from some of its recent meetings.
How can TEPCO have an impact? One recent example is through procurement reform. From planning solar PV projects, we know that the prices we are told for construction of 66kV interconnect lines/towers in Japan is some significant multiple of what it would be in Europe, and the reason seems to be that the work has traditionally been doled out to affiliates/subsidiaries of the utilities (and their friends).
According to the Denki Shimbun July 4, 2013, TEPCO has recently announced that it has reformed its procurement of construction of transmission facilities, implementing a new competitive tender system. In its first series of tenders, TEPCO saved 30-40% over the prices it would get previously. Still higher pricing than elsewhere, but a big difference. And a huge change if it carries over into the amount that we need to pay in planning larger solar PV projects.
Apparently, the other electric utilities are concerned they will be found out as not trying hard enough to obtain market-based pricing, and are struggling how to respond. ...
TEPCO was traditionally the leader of the 10 regional electric utilities. It was the biggest by revenue, personnel, profit and visibility, and it took the lead on most matters of policy, with the other companies generally following behind and stepping into line.
Recently, however, TEPCO has been different. It seems that one condition to the (first -- more to come) bailout was that TEPCO act as a positive force for change in the industry, in line with METI/government policies. Initially, the group of electric utilities became leaderless. Now, however, others are stepping up, and TEPCO is positively excluded from some of the discussions among the group presidents (which are commonplace, and are conducted via the Denki Jigyou Rengo Kai -- a group housed within the Keidanren Building and formed of the presidents of the utilities. Needless to say, this group does not support major structural reforms of the industry, and so excludes TEPCO from some of its recent meetings.
How can TEPCO have an impact? One recent example is through procurement reform. From planning solar PV projects, we know that the prices we are told for construction of 66kV interconnect lines/towers in Japan is some significant multiple of what it would be in Europe, and the reason seems to be that the work has traditionally been doled out to affiliates/subsidiaries of the utilities (and their friends).
According to the Denki Shimbun July 4, 2013, TEPCO has recently announced that it has reformed its procurement of construction of transmission facilities, implementing a new competitive tender system. In its first series of tenders, TEPCO saved 30-40% over the prices it would get previously. Still higher pricing than elsewhere, but a big difference. And a huge change if it carries over into the amount that we need to pay in planning larger solar PV projects.
Apparently, the other electric utilities are concerned they will be found out as not trying hard enough to obtain market-based pricing, and are struggling how to respond. ...
Separation of Generation and Transmission
It is now election season in Japan, with an upcoming poll for the House of Councillors. I happened to watch the leaders of the major (and minor) parties briefly on one of Japan's Sunday morning talk shows, and was pleasantly surprised to hear Prime Minister Abe specifically mention electricity reform and "separation of electricity generation and transmission" (発電、送電の分類) again as one of his growth measures.
Not only is this one of his list of Abenomics growth measures, but it is getting prominent attention. It must play well as a counter to the chorus of voices that it is too early to restart the nukes, before the Fukushima accident has been cleaned up.
Thursday, June 27, 2013
Offshore wind turbines ready for test
The press this week was full of this photo
showing the massive floating turbines being readied for a test off of Fukushima.
A few weeks ago we saw this picture of the massive chains that will be used for moorings.
The project sponsors and government certainly like the symbolism of a big offshore project near the Fukushima reactors. They have named it "Fukushima Mirai" -- the future of Fukushima.
Let us hope that the project works out from both a technical and a cost/performance standpoint, and maybe even manages to utilize the 500kV transmission lines running between the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and the Tokyo region.
The Fukushima offshore wind project website is now accessible here.
showing the massive floating turbines being readied for a test off of Fukushima.
A few weeks ago we saw this picture of the massive chains that will be used for moorings.
The project sponsors and government certainly like the symbolism of a big offshore project near the Fukushima reactors. They have named it "Fukushima Mirai" -- the future of Fukushima.
Let us hope that the project works out from both a technical and a cost/performance standpoint, and maybe even manages to utilize the 500kV transmission lines running between the Fukushima Daiichi reactors and the Tokyo region.
The Fukushima offshore wind project website is now accessible here.
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
Conservation and Efficiency
A big part of the solution to the world's energy problems lies in efficiency. On this most people can agree. A shift from incandescent to LED lights cuts direct electricity consumption by 85 percent or more. 7 watts instead of 60 watts. The same amount of light, but less heat so this shift also reduces the need for air conditioning. Insulated walls and ceilings, double/triple glazed windows -- can cut heating and cooling usage by 50%. Fewer big SUVs and more automobiles with hybrid electric or high efficiency diesel engines -- cut gasoline consumption by 20%, 30% or more over 15 years as the auto fleet is replaced.
The U.S. has little to teach the world on these topics, being the biggest consumer of energy by far over the past century. On the flip side, this means that the U.S. will have easier gains from energy efficiency increases than many other countries. Japan ... is somewhere in the middle. It used to be the most miserly developed country in terms of energy consumption, but now my understanding is that much of northern Europe surpasses it in terms of efficiency. So there is plenty of room for efficiency gains.
How much is really possible to save from increased efficiency and conservation? The Washington Post reports on e2e, a new effort at MIT and UC Berkeley that will try to marshall the evidence. The key is to find areas where investments get the most "bang for the buck."
Japan has a number of very successful efforts -- its electric appliances are extremely high efficiency compared with many in the U.S., and shopping for a TV or refrigerator allows one to compare anticipated electricity consumption easily, figures prominently displayed. But Japan sometimes seems weak in the "bang for the buck" choices, pursuing ideas that have the most corporate backing, the most interesting technology, or that have caught a powerful individual or lobby's attention.
One area where Japan has "low hanging fruit" available from conservation and efficiency -- building standards. As I understand it, Japan has none when it comes to energy efficiency. This is one reason why Japanese houses (and smaller apartment buildings) are notoriously cold in winter and hot in summer.
Another suggestion -- when planning new roads, why not implement roundabouts (traffic circles) instead of traffic lights? Europe has done so, to the extent you can travel very long distances on secondary roads without ever stopping at a traffic light. ... whereas in Japan one ends up sitting at what seems like empty intersection after empty intersection.
UPDATE: For a good example of the "low hanging fruit" available in the U.S., which is well behind Japan in the rotation from incandescent to compact flourescent to LED lighting, see this article in the October 6, 2013 CS Monitor. A factory saves more than 90% of its lighting bill (from over $50,000 to under $5,000 a month) by implementing an LED system with a sophisticated monitoring system that provides light in the right amount where and when needed. 2 year full payback on the investment.
The U.S. has little to teach the world on these topics, being the biggest consumer of energy by far over the past century. On the flip side, this means that the U.S. will have easier gains from energy efficiency increases than many other countries. Japan ... is somewhere in the middle. It used to be the most miserly developed country in terms of energy consumption, but now my understanding is that much of northern Europe surpasses it in terms of efficiency. So there is plenty of room for efficiency gains.
How much is really possible to save from increased efficiency and conservation? The Washington Post reports on e2e, a new effort at MIT and UC Berkeley that will try to marshall the evidence. The key is to find areas where investments get the most "bang for the buck."
Japan has a number of very successful efforts -- its electric appliances are extremely high efficiency compared with many in the U.S., and shopping for a TV or refrigerator allows one to compare anticipated electricity consumption easily, figures prominently displayed. But Japan sometimes seems weak in the "bang for the buck" choices, pursuing ideas that have the most corporate backing, the most interesting technology, or that have caught a powerful individual or lobby's attention.
One area where Japan has "low hanging fruit" available from conservation and efficiency -- building standards. As I understand it, Japan has none when it comes to energy efficiency. This is one reason why Japanese houses (and smaller apartment buildings) are notoriously cold in winter and hot in summer.
Another suggestion -- when planning new roads, why not implement roundabouts (traffic circles) instead of traffic lights? Europe has done so, to the extent you can travel very long distances on secondary roads without ever stopping at a traffic light. ... whereas in Japan one ends up sitting at what seems like empty intersection after empty intersection.
UPDATE: For a good example of the "low hanging fruit" available in the U.S., which is well behind Japan in the rotation from incandescent to compact flourescent to LED lighting, see this article in the October 6, 2013 CS Monitor. A factory saves more than 90% of its lighting bill (from over $50,000 to under $5,000 a month) by implementing an LED system with a sophisticated monitoring system that provides light in the right amount where and when needed. 2 year full payback on the investment.
Friday, June 14, 2013
First Electricity Reform Bill To Pass ... after Election
Japan's House of Representatives on June 13 2013 passed the first in a set of legislation intended to reform Japan's electricity system. The legislation is headed to the House of Councillors, where it is also expected to pass.
The reform is to proceed in 3 arrows (just like the "three arrows" of Prime Minister Abe's economic policy, Abenomics). I guess the LDP government is made up of archers. The first "arrow" is as follows:
First, by the beginning of 2015, a new entity will be established that is responsible for the wide-area transmission grid. This entity will be responsible for balancing demand across the country and will help to resolve the regional balkanization issues. As I understand it, the existing transmission assets will remain under the ownership of the regional utilities, but the new entity will become the active player in running the grid, and will be tasked to address issues such as increasing the ability to transmit electricity in between east and west Japan (50 and 60 hz regions), as well as from areas such as Hokkaido that can support much greater renewables (wind and solar) generation than local demand requires.
There are lots of details to work out before we know whether this grid operator will be set up so as to function in a truly independent manner, or will just be a captive of the existing utilities, but at least the issues of independence are being highlighted.
Also, the law will place an obligation upon the utilities to provide access to their transmission/distribution grid, at regulated prices, for "self-consumption" of electricity. This will allow a major industrial or commercial user to generate electricity at one location and consume it at a second, remote location.
Lastly, there is provision in the law for a more flexible system of demand control measures. Apparently under current law the ministry can only issue "orders" to reduce consumption, violation of which involve serious penalties. The new structure will allow more flexible arrangements, as companies have complained about the legal risk they face when they try, yet fail, to comply with a demand reduction request.
The second "arrow" is retail electricity competition, with electricity sales to small/residential users to be liberalized by 2016. The third "arrow" is separation of generation and transmission functions by 2018 to 2020. These last 2 arrows are not in the current legislation, as I understand it, but will be proposed in 2014 and 2015. The utilities are still fighting a hard battle against the separation of generation and transmission, given its impact upon their current organization and financial structure. The utilities hope that by 2015 they will have been able to restart substantial numbers of nuclear plants, there will be a comfortable margin of excess electricity supply and the demand for reform will dissipate. We shall see.
There will be a difficult fight ahead, and the LDP's dominance if, as expected, they win a landslide in this summer's upper house election, will give the incumbent utilities a somewhat stronger hand politically. But the utilities have failed to present a credible vision of what Japan's future electricity system would look like, of how it will respond to changes in technology, to a changing energy mix and a changing economic environment. And like it or not, the utilities will not restart significant number of nuclear reactors over the next 12-18 months, and electricity rates will be going up, not down, the press will occasionally remind us all about problems at Fukushima, and this reform will be difficult to stop.
UPDATE 2013 6 27:
Yesterday, the Upper House of the Diet passed a non-binding censure motion against Prime Minister Abe, promoted by several small opposition parties and, at the last minute joined in by the DPJ, a last "in your face" gesture before the upcoming Upper House election. The Upper House is still controlled by the DPJ and other opposition parties, and one result of this turn of events is the failure of the Upper House to act on the electricity reform bill. This and other legislation will need to wait until later in the year, after the election in which the LDP is widely predicted to win in a landslide.
The reform is to proceed in 3 arrows (just like the "three arrows" of Prime Minister Abe's economic policy, Abenomics). I guess the LDP government is made up of archers. The first "arrow" is as follows:
First, by the beginning of 2015, a new entity will be established that is responsible for the wide-area transmission grid. This entity will be responsible for balancing demand across the country and will help to resolve the regional balkanization issues. As I understand it, the existing transmission assets will remain under the ownership of the regional utilities, but the new entity will become the active player in running the grid, and will be tasked to address issues such as increasing the ability to transmit electricity in between east and west Japan (50 and 60 hz regions), as well as from areas such as Hokkaido that can support much greater renewables (wind and solar) generation than local demand requires.
There are lots of details to work out before we know whether this grid operator will be set up so as to function in a truly independent manner, or will just be a captive of the existing utilities, but at least the issues of independence are being highlighted.
Also, the law will place an obligation upon the utilities to provide access to their transmission/distribution grid, at regulated prices, for "self-consumption" of electricity. This will allow a major industrial or commercial user to generate electricity at one location and consume it at a second, remote location.
Lastly, there is provision in the law for a more flexible system of demand control measures. Apparently under current law the ministry can only issue "orders" to reduce consumption, violation of which involve serious penalties. The new structure will allow more flexible arrangements, as companies have complained about the legal risk they face when they try, yet fail, to comply with a demand reduction request.
The second "arrow" is retail electricity competition, with electricity sales to small/residential users to be liberalized by 2016. The third "arrow" is separation of generation and transmission functions by 2018 to 2020. These last 2 arrows are not in the current legislation, as I understand it, but will be proposed in 2014 and 2015. The utilities are still fighting a hard battle against the separation of generation and transmission, given its impact upon their current organization and financial structure. The utilities hope that by 2015 they will have been able to restart substantial numbers of nuclear plants, there will be a comfortable margin of excess electricity supply and the demand for reform will dissipate. We shall see.
There will be a difficult fight ahead, and the LDP's dominance if, as expected, they win a landslide in this summer's upper house election, will give the incumbent utilities a somewhat stronger hand politically. But the utilities have failed to present a credible vision of what Japan's future electricity system would look like, of how it will respond to changes in technology, to a changing energy mix and a changing economic environment. And like it or not, the utilities will not restart significant number of nuclear reactors over the next 12-18 months, and electricity rates will be going up, not down, the press will occasionally remind us all about problems at Fukushima, and this reform will be difficult to stop.
UPDATE 2013 6 27:
Yesterday, the Upper House of the Diet passed a non-binding censure motion against Prime Minister Abe, promoted by several small opposition parties and, at the last minute joined in by the DPJ, a last "in your face" gesture before the upcoming Upper House election. The Upper House is still controlled by the DPJ and other opposition parties, and one result of this turn of events is the failure of the Upper House to act on the electricity reform bill. This and other legislation will need to wait until later in the year, after the election in which the LDP is widely predicted to win in a landslide.
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
Disguised Bailouts – Evidence that Electricity Deregulation (and Re-regulation) is Going to Happen
As recently as March, there were growing concerns about
whether the LDP government, heavily influenced by the business community in
general and the electric utilities specifically, would follow through on plans
to introduce retail electricity competition and, eventually, a degree of
separation among electricity generation, transmission and distribution
functions needed for an environment that will support the existence of
competitive supply and distribution companies.
In other words, would the current system of dominant regional electric
utilities fight off attempts at reform, as they did in the late 1990s when
similar reforms went forward in Europe, North America, Australia and many other
places?
Several announcements last week lead me to conclude that, this
time, the system will end up being reformed. These announcements represent massive
potential transfers to the utilities, to help them solve the problems they will
face if systemic reform goes ahead.
Thus, in Japan, reform of a powerful industry involves placing the costs
of past mistakes upon the ratepayers and the taxpayers, rather than driving the
utilities into insolvency, creating distress among their lenders (all major Japanese
financial institutions), etc., etc.
First, and perhaps most important, METI has floated
plans to revise the utility rate base accounting in order to allow utilities to
avoid massive write-downs and instead recover, spread over a number of years (approximately
10 years) in their electricity charges, the cost of decommissioning reactors
prior to conclusion of their 40-year planned operating life. This sets the stage for the utilities to end
the “kabuki” play of spending money trying to reopen reactors that, in fact,
are very unlikely to meet the new regulatory standards. Of course, in Japan, these things take time--too
much time. And this is a massive
disguised bailout by the ratepayers, and one that does not require any direct
pound of flesh, such as a change of utility management.
That said, it is a necessary and welcome step. And as between the ratepayers and the
taxpayers, it is better that the ratepayers bear the burden, since high and
increasing charges by incumbent utilities will actually make it easier for new
entrants, for investment in conservation and renewables, etc.
Second, the Nikkei reported that METI is proposing
legislation to make it easier to provide governmental aid to a retail
electricity provider that faces financial difficulties, adding some “catch all”
circumstances to what had been narrowly permitted aid. This is reported as an effort to help assure
continued retail service to customers in the event that retail distribution
companies suffer financial difficulties after introduction of competition. Again, a disguised bailout, on stand-by,
which seems intended to assure the incumbent utilities and retail customers.
Third, Chubu Electric and TEPCO have announced plans for a
large new thermal plant in the TEPCO service area. Chubu Electric plans to use its share of the
generated power to serve customers in Kanto – TEPCO’s service area. This is the first sign of mutual competition
at the wholesale level. Of course, the regional utility structure in Japan is akin to the regional "baby bells" in the United States after AT&T was split up, so it is quite unlikely these companies will be the source of real competition in each other's service areas, except for limited large customers with whom they have existing relationships.
Fourth, the latest “Abenomics” announcements of government
growth plans clearly mention the introduction of competition in the electricity
area as part of Prime Minister Abe’s growth strategy. This seems a stronger endorsement than anything
I have seen in the past.
Lastly, I went to a seminar last month on the future of
Japan’s electricity industry. One of the
speakers is an ex-utility executive who now leads a research center at Tokyo
University on smart grid implementation in Japan. He was very clear that while he had once thought the concept unrealistic, he now believes the smart grid is
coming, along with distributed generation and separated generation, transmission and distribution functions. There is no alternative.
Monday, May 27, 2013
Huge Storage Battery Planned for Hokkaido to support renewables
Hokkaido has the best wind resources in Japan. It also has the most readily available land for solar PV projects. Unfortunately, it has a population of only 5.4 million persons, less than 5% of Japan's total. Like much of Japan, population is not growing.
There is a huge bottleneck now of potential solar PV projects in Hokkaido, far more than the demand at the local electric utility, Hokkaido Electric. As of March end, 2013, Hokkaido Electric had authorized interconnection for 400MWp of large scale solar PV projects, against applications of 1.56GW peak.
Thus, in late April, 2013, METI issued a request for public comments on a suggested modification to the curtailment rules that would, initially at least, affect only Hokkaido and would permit greater flexibility in curtailment, in order to make it possible for the utility to accommodate additional projects. We hope that the resulting rules will encourage diversity in project design, rather than making Hokkaido projects uneconomic and unfinanceable.
As an additional step, METI announced a 20 billion yen ($200 million) subsidy for Hokkaido Electric to implement a massive storage battery. The battery project will include 60MWh of electricity storage.
The kind of investments needed to transform the electric system in Japan will not be feasible using such one-off subsidies. Nor will they be feasible if just added as a burden on the existing utilities without a real unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)